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Irregular employment, contrast to the expected regular (fulltime and long-term) 
employment, has made up a significant part of Japan’s work force since the 1990s. By 
examining quantitative and qualitative data showcasing historic and current 
mistreatment and devaluation of irregular workers and displaying them as inferior to 
regular workers, one can observe the lack of urgency by both business leaders and 
policy makers towards assisting irregular workers in a situation like COVID-19 that has 
negative impacts on all. 
 Through the visible disparities between these types of workers, this thesis 
argues how societal and political views of irregular workers overall, of young irregular 
workers in particular, along with the resulting decisions made in combatting labor 
related issues, are harmful to the wellbeing of individuals during COVID-19 and are 
detrimental to making major long-term changes to Japan’s work styles and labor force. 
It is especially important to address these issues during a time of prevalent feelings of 
precarity and uncertainty towards the current labor force crisis during national 
discussions of what to do about Japan’s “hyper aging society” and about crises caused 
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In this thesis, I will highlight the situation of irregular employment among 
young individuals in Japan. I argue that there are policy level and societal barriers that 
cause disparities between irregularly employed individuals and regularly employed 
individuals. I will substantiate my argument through four chapters highlighting: 
background on the different types of work in Japan; the effects of COVID-19 on 
irregular workers; and cultural and societal level issues and government and corporation 
level issues that relate to irregular work. Through these four sections, I will argue how 
the societal and political views of irregular workers overall, and especially of young 
irregular workers in particular, along with the resulting decisions made in combatting 
labor related issues, are harmful to the wellbeing of individuals during COVID-19 and 
are detrimental to making major long-term changes to work styles and the labor force in 
Japan. 
Methods 
This thesis will utilize several different types of sources and data to make my 
argument including, data sets from recent studies on COVID-19, surveys, ethnographic 
data, and even film and television. Additionally, while it is never appropriate to 
overgeneralize an entire population based solely on assumptions and observations of 
cultures and cultural norms, studying these can lead to insights to understanding general 
trends and reasoning for groups of people. As I am engaging in research that pertains to 
Japan, and I do not consider myself to be fully of Japanese culture, looking at 




situations on a deeper level. To do so, I will also include an overview of Geert 
Hofstede’s intercultural dimensions and how Japan scores compare to the United States. 
This will be followed by a brief exploration of some specific cultural themes that relate 
to Japan, in addition to a look into how youth employment and irregular employment, 
and the issues associated with them, are portrayed in popular culture and popular media. 
Moreover, I will include some mainstream television dramas and films surrounding the 
topic of irregular work, and, although Japanese television dramas and films are works of 
fiction, as they are heavily consumed by Japanese viewers, they provide an indication of 
overarching cultural attitudes towards the situation exist in Japan. The usage of irregular 
employment and avoidance of regular employment in film and television as a form of 
conflict is reflective of societal norms but also can serve as an indicator and warning of 
the uncertainty that taking up positions in irregular employment can create.  
For the sections other than the culture and societal values section, I also analyze 
several sources of qualitative and quantitative data. I do want to point out that most data 
sources with age breakdowns in labor participation identify the youngest group to be 
between the ages of fifteen and thirty-four as youth. While this is the case technically, 
for this project, I am primarily considering youth in employment aged twenty or older. 
My reasoning for this focus is that as twenty is the legal age of adulthood in Japan, and 
many people below that age are high-school students working part-time jobs, those 
under the age of twenty are seldomly living on solely their own incomes.  
 Had this project not been affected by COVID-19, I planned for my data to 




was not a possibility due to the pandemic. I initially intended to focus entirely on the 
aspect of stigmatization of irregularly employed and unemployed youth and wanted to 
interview both “normal” workers and irregular workers to gain insight on the matter. In 
retrospect, accessing these individuals, even if I had gone to Japan, may have also posed 
difficulties, so I presume that my methods would have still changed regardless. 
Nonetheless, given my current situation, I have shifted my focus to specifically how 
COVID-19 plays a role in the lives of these individuals and how they may be more 
vulnerable than normal workers during this time. I will use quantitative and qualitative 
data produced mostly by the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare 
(MHLW), the Japanese Institute of Labor Policy and Training, and ethnographic papers 
produced by Dr. David Slater and his colleagues affiliated with Sophia University in 
Tokyo.   
Overview of Quantitative Data Sources 
  The use of qualitative data in this thesis will help me to answer the questions of 
how big of a population irregular workers make up, as well as what specific reasons for 
working in irregular work exist, and what the impacts of COVID-19 have been. I look 
at quantitative data in the form of statistics from surveys conducted by the MHLW, as 
well as the Statistics Bureau of Japan. An additional survey I examine for this project 
targets specifically what effects COVID-19 had early on in the months of April, May, 
and August 2020. This survey, titled the “Survey on the Impact that Spreading Novel 
Coronavirus Infection has on Work and Daily Life,” was conducted by the Japanese 




COVID-19, as well as changes experienced by employees, both regular and irregular, in 
terms of income, income expenditure, and working hours.  
Overview of Qualitative Data Sources:  
  I will analyze the annual White Papers on the Labor Economy presented by the 
MHLW to understand how the labor force and ideas of systems and structure in work 
environments have changed. These White Papers will help me answer my question 
about what Japan can do, and has been doing, to encourage more participation of 
unemployed and irregularly employed individuals in the labor force, as the document 
indicates what techniques in workplaces are working and not working to create suitable 
environments for employees. Because annual White Papers highlight what the major 
concerns in the workplace are every year, I plan to present this data to see how irregular 
groups are discussed or if they are instead swept under the rug. I analyze White Papers 
for 2019 and 2020, focusing on the condensed PowerPoint presentation documents. By 
looking at the condensed versions, one can gain a clearer view of the key points the 
MHLW considered most important.  
Moreover, the next crucial component of my research questions is how the 
pandemic plays a role individually in the lives of irregular workers and unemployed 
individuals, and in Japan as a whole. Professor of Anthropology at Sophia University 
(Tokyo, Japan), David Slater, has been putting a set of ethnographies together about 
vulnerable populations in Japan during COVID-19 and publishing them in the Asia 
Pacific Journal. Out of the different sets of articles that have published through the Asia 




discuss and utilize some quotes from the individuals the authors were able to interview. 
The four focus groups will include freelancers, sanitation workers, restaurant workers, 
and red-light district entertainment workers.   
 Additionally, there are increasing numbers of videos produced by Japanese 
YouTubers who self-identify as unemployed or irregular workers. These videos shed 
light onto their situations and what the pandemic has meant in their lives. Because 
YouTube is a public outlet and there are no requirements about sharing one’s identity as 
a content creator, it can be difficult to use YouTube videos of people claiming to be 
sharing truth from their lives. For this reason, while I was able to find many YouTube 
videos from different individuals who shared how COVID-19 had impacted their work, 
or simply shared experiences as irregular and unemployed workers as a whole, for this 
project, I have chosen to focus on one particular individual and the channel he has 
created surrounding his life as a self-identified freeter. This individual shares the 
physical paper copies of his bills and bank statements and documents his experiences of 
making payments and the like that lend to the credibility of the videos on his channel as 
accurate representations of his life. Additionally, as this individual began his YouTube 
channel in June of 2020, right during the first wave of COVID-19 in Japan, and uploads 
several videos a week, the content is effective in maintaining relevancy to this project 
by showcasing changes in his life in conjunction with changes in the pandemic. In 
general, the qualitative data that I analyze is useful to answer my questions of how the 
individuals view their own situation during the pandemic, as well as how they are 





 One of the major limitations to my methods and the data that I am analyzing is 
that my project is COVID-19 specific, and research regarding the economic effects of 
the pandemic and how different groups have been affected by it is still being conducted 
and published. While this makes for an extremely relevant thesis project, it also requires 
me to thoroughly keep up with the research component while I write my thesis. 
Additionally, as many people in Japan view irregular employment more negatively than 
they do normal employment, the survey data available about the workforce does not 
always go into depth about irregular workers.  However, by using the mixture of both 
quantitative and qualitative data that I have identified above, I believe that I can fill in 
some gaps in the quantitative data and present a more complete picture of the situation 
than what the Japanese government and related organizations choose to reflect in the 
collection and presentation of their data statistics. I also believe that seeing what ideas 
official organizations cover and what ideas they do not, is imperative to discuss what 
kind of steps may be helpful for both Japan’s goals of strengthening the workforce and 
improving the wellbeing of irregular workers.  
Another limitation to my project that I encountered while attempting to collect 
demographical data about youth in irregular employment is that much of the data about 
the youth category fully encompasses the fifteen-to thirty-four age range, instead of the 
twenty to thirty-four age range that I am considering. Information that does not include 
irregular workers aged fifteen to twenty may have been more representative of my 




school age part-time workers. This is not to say that irregular employment in high-
school age individuals is not important to consider, but one can assume, and hope, that 






Chapter 1: What is Youth Irregular Employment and What is the 
Current State of Youth Irregular Employment During COVID-19   
Types of Employment in Japan and Youth Irregular Employment  
At the end of World War II, Japan began to globalize and industrialize much 
more extensively which shifted the working dynamic of Japan. This shift resulted in a 
new norm of employment in Japan, and  “salarymen,” the Japanese term for 
businessman and a job that had been around since the beginning of the twentieth 
century, came to represent of the Japanese workforce. These employees were mostly 
men in full-time positions in careers and companies where they would remain in for the 
rest of their employed lives, or so-called “lifetime employment” (seishain) (Dasgupta 
2017).  
 Later on, in 1991, the crash of Japan’s bubble economy resulted in the 
restructure of employment and the workforce. Many already established salarymen and 
other fulltime workers faced hardship, losing jobs. Others, mostly young college 
graduates entering the job hunting (shūshoku katsudō, or shukatsu) process, encountered 
difficulty in trying to find fulltime long-term positions and were often unable to find a 
job at all. Temporary employment, and more specifically, private temporary staff 
agencies, was not fully legal until 1999, although temporary employment was able to 
gain momentum in becoming legal in 1984, when the Special Committee on Temporary 
Help Industry was established to highlight the merits and benefits of shifting to utilizing 
temporary employment. Also, in 1984, the Temporary Work Services Association 




approved, they joined an international organization for temporary work and renamed 
themselves the Japanese Staffing Services Association (Coe 2011). 
 Another type of irregular work besides temporary contract work that began to 
gain in popularity among younger Japanese individuals was working part-time jobs as a 
main source of income. During the late 1990s and the early 2000s, these individuals 
were given the title of “freeter.” The term was first used in the magazine From A, which 
featured ads for people looking for part-time work. While readers wanted to be “free” 
from the constraints from fulltime, corporate jobs to pursue freelance careers, others 
were looking for part-time work out of economic necessity.  While the term freeter is 
still used in Japan today, there is much less emphasis on the term and the individuals 
associated with the term than there was in the 1990s and early 2000s. Some people have 
used freeter with derogatory connotations, as they believed that freeters were not 
motivated or qualified enough to pursue long-term fulltime jobs and actually receive 
these offers from companies. However, some people have used the term in a general 
fashion, as freeter can refer to any individual working in part-time labor as their main 
income, regardless of their desire to be in that position or not. There are cases of freeters 
who are satisfied with the lifestyles they are able to have with the income they receive 
from part-time, even if it is significantly less than what they would earn as seishain. 
Other so-called freeters are in the process of job hunting and are engaging in part-time 
labor just as a means of survival until acquiring a fulltime job (Coe 2011). Another 
group that rose in numbers at the same time as freeters was NEETs, which can be 




NEETs have been interested in finding work or education while others do not actively 
seek employment or education (Rahman 2006).  
 A new term and group of irregularly employed individuals that has become 
increasingly popular in recent years is freelancers. According to an article by The 
Bridge from January 2018, Japan really began to see its freelancing boom through a 
Tokyo-based startup company called Lancers. In December 2017, Lancers announced 
that it had raised an equivalent of $9 million from Persol Holdings and Shinsei Bank. 
Partnerships with these two companies was part of a new strategy by Lancers to initiate 
a financing business for freelancers. The article also states that Lancers reported that the 
“number of freelancers in Japan [was] 11.22 million comprising 17 percent of the entire 
working population, showing a 5 percent increase from last year [2016]” (Hirano 2018). 
Lancers’ business would go on to operate by providing loans to freelancers seeking to 
start new businesses which would be used for investing in necessary equipment and 
education and/or training.  A Japanese website with resources for freelancers and those 
considering becoming freelancers, Freelance Start, put together a report based on data 
from Lancers, suggesting that Japan’s number of freelancers for 2020 is 10.34 million. 
While this number is a decrease from 2018, the report also indicated that the reason for 
the decrease in freelancers is that the number of freelancers aged sixty and older, 
decreased and led to an overall decrease in the number of total freelancers in Japan 
(Freelance Start 2020). (Sixty used to be the mandatory retirement age in Japan.) 
 From this brief background of the history of irregular employment in Japan 
since the 1990s, it is clear that irregular employment is a component of the workforce 




freelancing. As the use of “regular employee” in translation for seishain already begins 
to suggest, and will be expanded on later in this paper, regular employment tends to be 
seen in a much more positive light than irregular employment. With this being the case, 
one might wonder why irregular work exists and why people may even voluntarily 
choose to take up irregular employment.  
Some Reasons Why Young People Do Not or Choose Not to Work in “regular” 
employment 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s when the terms freeters and NEETs became 
popular, discussing these individuals in scholarly discourses, from political, economic, 
and even psychological perspectives also became popular. There has been some 
research done to understand why individuals become NEETs or freeters or engage in 
other types of irregular employment instead of taking up long-term fulltime jobs that 
were more popular with the generations before them, and conclusions from the studies 
often have conflicting views of the situation. Moreover, it is important to note that 
becoming an irregular worker is not always a choice, and for some it comes as a result 
of other underlying factors outside of desire and motivation to become a regular worker.  
 One of the most prominent scholars on the subject of NEETs and freeters in the 
early 2000s, Genda Yuji (professor specializing in labor economics at the University of 
Tokyo Institute of Social Science) stated that, “There have been many published 
opinions about the NEETs in Japanese media in 2005 and 2006. Some described NEETs 
as lazy, spoiled, and undisciplined, while others emphasized that they face obstacles to 
employment” (Genda 2007). Genda further noted that these assumptions were not 




Employment Status Survey (Shūgyo) to get a deeper understanding of who “jobless 
youth” in particular were and possibilities for why they did not become seishain. Based 
on his data analysis, Genda was able to conclude that there were many commonalities 
among jobless youth regarding educational backgrounds and family backgrounds that 
suggest exterior causation rather than just simply lack of motivation. Genda was able to 
identify three main types of jobless youth: (1) “job seekers,” or those wishing to work 
for earnings and are actively searching for jobs; (2) those who have stopped looking for 
jobs while expressing that they would like to have a job; and (3) those who do not want 
a job and do not look for one whatsoever. Genda explained that it is the Type 2 and 
Type 3 jobless youth that typically make up what is referred to as NEETs in Japan. The 
Shūgyo data that Genda analyzed went into depth on why Type 2 jobless youth no were 
no longer looking for work with the most popular reasons being: illness/injury (24 
percent), inability to find a job (12.6 percent), lack of confidence in knowledge or skill 
(9.9 percent), “poor prospects of being able to find a job” (9.6 percent), and 
housekeeping and children (3.2 percent). However, the same breakdown was not 
available for Type 3 jobless youth which left little to work with to understand Type 3 
jobless youth and their reasons for not entering the workforce (Genda 2007). 
Through looking at Genda’s interpretations of the situation and the lack of 
thorough research done on irregularly employed and unemployed youth, one is able to 
get a sense of the invalidity of the prejudgments that exist about these individuals. 
Genda’s work also shows the irony in the characterization of these irregularly employed 
individuals as problematic when opportunities for organizations to better understand the 




Genda only focused on NEETs, this is accurate across many forms of irregular 
employment and unemployment in youth.  
Another view of youth in Japan avoiding working in regular employment can be 
found in a 2011 article by Tuukka Toivonen et al, titled “Unable to Conform, Unwilling 
to Rebel? Youth, Culture, and Motivation in Globalizing Japan,” which showcases the 
effects of globalization in Japan and more specifically Japan’s youth. The authors state 
that they focus on youth “because it can be reasonably expected that, lacking labor 
market experience and related resources, young adults in their twenties are likely to feel 
the pressures of globalization more directly and acutely than many other age groups” 
(Toivonen et al 2011). In stating this, the authors argue that young adults are caught in 
the gap of what has been considered normal by the age group that raised them as well as 
the views of their peers. Additionally, in a time dominated by social media and ease of 
global interconnectedness, it is much easier for youth to have globalized opinions that 
may contradict the dominant views of their own nation.  
Shūgyo Employment Status Survey 2017  
  Moreover, since 1997, the Statistics Bureau of Japan has been conducting the 
Employment Status Survey to get an understanding of the breakdown of the labor force. 
The most recent survey was conducted in 2017, with the next survey planned for 2022. 
Looking at the data presented in the summary of results, the employment status survey 
showed figures of those engaged or not engaged in the work force by age and sex. 
Overall, the survey identified that the ration of persons engaged in work in Japan rose 




2017, indicating an overall growth in the labor force in the time period, although much 
more for women and men (Statistics Bureau 2017). 
The Employment Status Survey also looked into certain conditions for workers: 
providing childcare, taking care of elders, working hour adjustments, starting 
businesses, having a second job, being irregular employees, and double income 
households, to name a few. Pertaining to my project, I will focus on the section about 
irregular employment, while dipping into some other sections where irregular 
employment is mentioned. For the section of irregular workers, it was noted that, by 
averaging all prefectures in Japan to get a percentage of irregular workers among 
“Employees, excluding executive of company or corporation,” the percentage had not 
changed from 2012 to 2017 and remained at 38.2 percent of employees. Moreover, the 
survey also noted that percentage of the irregular workers who were considered young 
persons, aged fifteen to thirty-four years old, had actually decreased from 2012 to 2017 
overall, going from 35.3 percent in 2012 to 32.9 percent in 2017 (Statistics Bureau 
2017). These numbers were also shown in a breakdown based on prefecture which 
highlighted some disparities in the numbers of irregular employees depending on 
geographic locations that may indicate differing levels of opportunities for regular work 
in various urban and rural regions. Although there was a decrease in youth irregular 
employment in Japan from 2012 to 2017, irregular employment was shown to make up 
almost 40 percent of the work force, with a little over 30 percent of the irregular 
employees falling into the youth category (Statistics Bureau 2017). This indicates that 
irregular employment makes up a significant amount of all employment in Japan, which 




popularity of freelancing that has since the boom began in 2018 (Hirano 2018), if it 
were not for COVID-19, I would otherwise have felt confident in hypothesizing that the 
number of those engaged in irregular employment would grow in the 2022 results of the 
Employment Status Survey.  
Moreover, the survey also tried to understand the main reasons why irregular 
workers were working as irregular workers. The options available for respondents to 
choose as reasons included: “For working at convenient times,” “For supplementing 
family income or earning school expense,” “For housework, child-rearing or nursing 
care,” “For short commute time,” “For utilizing specialized skills,” and “Not obtaining 
a job as a regular employee.” The responses overall for Japan for each category were 
27.8, 20.3, 10.8, 4.9, 7.3 and 12.6 percent, respectively, suggesting that flexibility in 
terms of working time as well as providing for family income or paying for school were 
the most popular reasons for choosing to do irregular work (Statistics Bureau 2017). 
Furthermore, prefectural breakdowns for this data were also made available showing 
some geographic differences.  
Based on the responses from the Employment Status Survey and the views 
presented in the works by Genda and Toivonen et al., one can get the sense that, while 
in some cases, there may be individuals who lack motivation to get a long-term and 
fulltime jobs, there are many other factors for which irregular employees and 




Chapter 2: How Have Irregular Workers in Japan Been Impacted by 
COVID-19  
Utilizing data from the Statistics Bureau of Japan database, focusing on the 
months of October 2019 through March 2021, I would first like to highlight the most 
recent changes in employment since the pandemic. For changes in the unemployment 
rate for all genders, although while still relatively low from a global perspective, 
Japan’s unemployment rate began to increase since the lowest rate of just above 2 
percent in December of 2019, rising to its highest (as currently reported), at 3.1 percent 
in October of 2020. The unemployment rate has since decreased from the peak of 3.1 
percent but did see another peak at 2.9 percent in January of 2021. The most recent 
update to this unemployment rate as reported by the Statistics Bureau stands at a rate of 
2.7 percent. It is worth pointing out that the peaks in the unemployment rate seem to 
loosely follow the different waves of COVID-19 that I will mention later on (Statistics 
Bureau 2021). 
JILPT COVID-19 Survey    
The Japan Institute for Labor Policy and Training conducted the “Survey on the 
Impact that Spreading Novel Coronavirus Infection Has on Work and Daily Life” 
initially in April and May 2020, following up in August of 2020. The survey included 
4,307 “Employees of private enterprises” and 574 freelancers. The abstract of these 





“The main effects associated with the novel coronavirus infectious disease 
COVID-19 have shifted from “decrease in workdays and working hours 
(including temporary leave) to “decrease in income.” More than 60 percent of 
employees and 70 percent of freelance workers responded that they have anxiety 
attributable to “difficulty in daily life associated with decreased income.” 
Household income and expenditures for May to July 2020 showed many 
households with a deficit, with 40 percent of freelance workers falling into the 
red.” (JILPT 2020).  
This survey tackled some major issues including working hours and income and 
the data was separated for regular and irregular employment. Overall, regardless of 
regular or irregular employment, when asked about what adversities individuals were 
facing for each month (April, May, and August), respondents could choose eight 
options for their answers in April and twelve in May and August. They were allowed to 
choose more than one option. The initial eight options included: “dismissal from the 
company,” “termination of employment in expiration of the contract term,” “change in 
job content,” “decreased workdays and working hours,” “increased workdays and 
working hours,” “decreased income,” “none applicable,” and “do not want to answer.” 
Due to a high response in the “none applicable” category, an additional four options— 
“unemployment as a result of employer’s business suspension/discontinuation or 
bankruptcy,” “change of type of employment,” “increased income,” and “voluntary 
resignation” —were included to try to gain more insight into the responses. 
Overwhelmingly, “decreased workdays and working hours” and “decreased income” 




August for these two options were higher than the results in April, indicating that, while 
some employees were able to return to work, as was indicated in other labor surveys, 
the normalcy in terms of work hours and income had not returned (JILPT 2020).  
Work hours were covered more extensively in the following pages, with data of 
what normal work week hours were for regular employees, non-regular employees, and 
all employees, separated into different graphs. Overall, the data indicated that, for both 
regular and non-regular workers, the second week of May seemed to bring the most 
significant change in work hours compared to pre COVID-19 times. Moreover, regular 
workers, although still experiencing significant changes in work hours, did not 
experience nearly as big of a shift in working hours as non-regular workers. While 
regular employment data showed that at its highest 7.2 percent (up from 1.9 percent 
originally) of regular workers were in the lowest hour bracket, “less than fifteen hours 
(including did not work)” while non-regular employees reached 31.2 percent in the 
lowest bracket, up from 10.5 percent during normal times. Additionally, another major 
point that was made was the increase in “work from home/telecommuting” days. For 
the before COVID-19 data, 73.1 percent of respondents said they did not work from 
home or telecommute, but this dropped all the way to 5.7 percent during the second 
week of May (JILPT 2020). Before the pandemic, telecommuting was rare in Japan, 
where face-to-face interactions and teamwork are valued, and employees are expected 
to put in “face time” at their companies and be seen by their coworkers while at work. 
In terms of income, it was stated that “more than one in four responded that their 
most recent monthly income “decreased,” and about 30 percent said that their summer 




ordered to stay home, 54.1 percent stated that at least half of their days at home were 
paid, and 21.9 percent stated that a portion of the days absent (less than half) were paid.  
Around 24 percent of respondents, said they were not paid at all.  
The survey also focused on freelance workers and indicated that, as of the end of 
July 2020, “more than 40 percent responded that they continue to feel an ‘impact on 
business performance’ (decrease in net sales/income).” Additionally, part of the survey 
asked whether employees were having to cut back on food expenses at home, and, while 
most regular employees were in the “surplus” of income and not having to cut back as 
much on food, over one third of irregular employees answered that they were “in the 
red,” meaning they were facing major difficulty in being able to pay for necessary 
expenditures. Freelancers also had a very high percentage of deficit. The percentage of 
those who needed to “cut back” rose by 14.1 percent points. These difficulties in “daily 
life” due to financial hardship from the pandemic have also translated into rising 
anxiety. Findings from the survey suggested that “anxiety with respect to difficulty in 
daily life associated with decreased income” is felt by a higher percentage of non-
regular employees (65.6 percent) than regular employees (61.3 percent). Among 
freelance workers, the percentage rose to 71.1 percent. Although it is clear that regular 
employees are still experiencing anxieties, the results also seem to show that it is taking 
more of a toll on irregular employees and freelancers (JILPT 2020).  
This data is incredibly important to my argument as it highlights that, while the 
burden of the pandemic has been felt by all, there are clear hour and wage decreases that 




Column – “Diminished Non-regular Employment, Solid Regular Employment: 
What Impacts Did the “Wave” of the COVID-19 Pandemic Have in Japan” by 
Takahashi Koji  
Takahashi Koji, a Vice Senior Researcher at JILPT whose research focuses on 
irregular work, presented his personal views of how COVID-19 has affected both 
regular and non-regular employment by analyzing the Labor Force Survey as well as 
the survey I analyzed above. Particularly, the labor force surveys that Takahashi 
focused on were from the months of January through June, showcasing the early 
impacts of COVID-19. Takahashi highlighted three main points in his analysis of the 
data: (1) irregular employment was first to be affected by the pandemic; (2) regular 
employment has “remained solid”; and (3) it seems that companies will not move 
toward more irregular employment as a result of the pandemic.  
 Takahashi noted that there was a difference in the impact of the pandemic 
depending on employment type stating that “non-regular employees were more likely to 
separate from their jobs in April and May than regular employees,” and “non-regular 
employees had larger decreases in their working hours that regular employees” 
(Takahashi 2020). He mentioned that, for data in the labor survey, irregular employees 
made up the bulk of the number of “employed persons not at work,” and the number of 
non-regular employees in general decreased by 970,000 in April 2020 compared to 
April 2019. Takahashi also stated that in the next month’s survey (May), “The number 
of non-regular employees not at work decreased while the numbers of employees at 
work and employed persons increased based on real numbers, and there were signs of 




it seem like there was a recovery, June’s data indicated that, compared to before 
COVID-19, “the size of non-regular employment decreased.” (Takahashi 2020). 
Moreover, Takahashi claimed that irregular workers at companies had been used as 
an “employment buffer” for companies and the regular workers at those companies 
because they delayed employment adjustment by bearing the burden first. Takahashi 
referenced the JILPT survey and how management within companies responded to how 
they would adjust employment within their companies. The data indicated that 16 
percent of respondents said they “will raise the percentage of regular employees”; 5.1 
percent said they “will raise the percentage of part time workers, temporary workers, 
and contract employees”; 1.3 percent said they “will raise the percentage of dispatched 
workers”; and the remaining percentage of the companies said they did not know what 
changes would be made. From this information, Takahashi drew the conclusion that 
increasing regular employment was the most desirable for companies in the future, even 
though it has been clear that having irregular employees during the pandemic has 
lessened the blow of the situation for regular employees and companies overall. This is 
a very interesting point to note as the desire of companies to raise numbers of regular 
employees was also expressed in the MHLW White Papers that will be discussed in 
Chapter 4.  
“Just a Freeter” (Tada no Furita) 
 Just as freelancers highlighted in the ethnography written by Satsuki Uno, a 
global marketer and localizer for a gaming company in Japan, and Robin O’Day, an 
“Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the University of North Georgia, shared their 




number of young individuals have taken to YouTube to share their experiences with 
employment or lack thereof during the pandemic. Many of these individuals self-
identify with some of the terms that I outlined at the beginning of this paper. There are a 
variety of different approaches that these individuals take to sharing these experiences, 
whether it be for what seems to be comedic or entertainment, or claiming they want to 
share their experiences for others who are going through similar situations. Nonetheless, 
there appears to be many more individuals taking to YouTube to share very personal 
issues and talk about their employment type or lack thereof which can be sensitive to 
stigma and critique overall by Japanese society. Keeping a cautious outlook to themes 
of identity and the Internet, after careful consideration, I have decided to highlight one 
particular individual who has shared his experiences through his YouTube channel.  
 With the channel name of Tada no Furita/Jinsei Dokyumento, or “Just a 
Freeter/Life Document,” a thirty-six-year-old man who goes by the name Kōsuke,  
originally from Aomori prefecture in northern Japan, began to document his life as a 
freeter with his first video published on June 17, 2020, during the first wave of COVID-
19 in Japan. According to the “About” section of his channel, he is single and looking to 
marry and completed high school as his highest level of education. He wrote that in  
2003 after graduating high school he “wanted to do the things he liked and with that in 
mind moved to the capital. While being a freeter, he pursued his plan of becoming a 
musician or famous comedian, and failed” (2003/ kōkō sotsugyōgo, sukina koto o 
shigoto ni shitai to omoi jōkyō. furi-ta- o shi nagara myu-jishan ya owarai geinin o 
kokorozasu mo zasetsusuru). He then claimed that in 2019 “for the sake of finding his 




five”  (2019/ ikigai o tsukuru tame, 35-sai de YouTube o honkakuteki ni hajimeru). As 
of May 2021, the channel has 12,700 subscribers with over two hundred videos 
published and has had 4,305,140 views on his videos in total.  (Sakashita 2020) 
As Kōsuke has indicated in his “About” page, he has had an interest in 
becoming a comedian over the years, and the more recent videos that he has been 
posting have been reflective of this and are more entertainment driven, in light of his 
growing popularity. However, I would like to highlight some of his earliest videos 
where he discussed how he lives as a freeter and his response to the impacts of COVID-
19.  
 Starting with his very first video on the channel titled “Poverty—10,000-yen 
allowance that I would die without and a single freeter’s meal alone” (Hinkon nai to 
shinu kyūfukin 10-man yen to dokushin furita no ichinin meshi), posted on June 18,2020 
with 52,608 views, Kōsuke gave an idea of how he lives paycheck to paycheck with his 
part-time work and paying  his bills, while physically showing the balances in his bank 
account as well as his bills to viewers. He noted that he was able to receive a 100,000-
yen (roughly $1,000) benefit from the government due to COVID-19 that allowed for 
him to survive until his next paycheck, as before receiving the benefit, he only had 
about 20,000 yen (roughly $200 USD) left. (“[Poverty] 10,00yen” 00:02:10-00:02:48). 
About receiving the COVID-19 aid money, he stated, “For a freeter like me, 100,000 
yen is an extremely large amount of money, and I am extremely grateful. I will 
carefully use it for my living expenses.” (furita no boku nitotte 10-man en nante 
mechakucha taikin nande, mechakucha ureshii desu ne. Kore wa daiji ni seikatsuhi ni 




 Moving on from his trip to the bank and paying his bill, he then had a meal and 
explained to viewers that on that day, his meal cost 1,209 yen, which was expensive for 
him, as ideally, he limits his spending to 500 yen a day (around $5). As it was his first 
video, he continued by introducing himself and his story and why he decided to start a 
YouTube channel, similar to his description in the abovementioned “About” page of his 
channel. Kōsuke stated, “It’s not just me living like this. People having a goal or dream 
that did not work out and end up in irregular work, just living quietly. There’s many 
people like me out there, but we never get the chance to have the spotlight on us, so 
with YouTube I want people to understand that people like us exist” (“[Poverty 10,000 
yen” 00:15:05-00:15:59 ).  
 Another video, posted almost a week later on June 24, 2020, titled “Single 
impoverished freeter’s delayed loan debt repayment negotiations. What will happen 
with stopping payments due to income decrease from the Coronavirus? Poverty 
Documentary” (Dokushin hinkon furita shakkin no chien songaikin kōshō. Korona 
shūnyūgen de hensai sutoppu dō naru? Hinkon dokyumento), highlights a specific 
situation occurring in Kōsuke’s life as a repercussion of COVID-19. Kōsuke explained 
how he had to delay his loan payments due to losing his side job as a result of COVID-
19. He was eventually able to make ends meet thanks to his manager at his main part-
time job allowing him to increase his hours. He documented his call with the loan 
company to work on being able to resume his delayed payments on his loan. (“Single 
impoverished freeter”)  
 The Tada no Furita channel is an important example of an individual involved 




as being viewed as contributing less to society for his participation in irregular work. 
Again, I want to avoid over-generalizing, as Kōsuke is just one irregular worker Japan 
and all experiences are different, but Kōsuke documenting his experiences and sharing 
his own values, allows, as he stated in his first video, for irregular workers to “take the 
spotlight.”. Additionally, it is worth noting, that by starting a YouTube channel, he has 
both been able to take a step forward in his dreams of comedy and fame, continuing to 
gain popularity through his channel, which can generate more income. Additionally, as 
Kōsuke reveals his finances and how he would not have been able to survive without 
the $1,000 COVID-19 relief payment and his difficulties paying his loans and other 
bills, he is able to show the reality of the anxieties that he is facing which can be 
reflective of sentiments held by many other irregular workers who have experienced 
decreases in wages and hours or have been fully let go from their jobs. Additionally, as 
was briefly mentioned in the introduction section, Kōsuke, through his channel Tada no 
Freeter is not the only irregularly employed individual who has taken to YouTube to 
share his experiences, as there are dozens of different irregular workers who have 
shared their situation within the last year. While I chose to highlight Kōsuke’s channel 
for its higher level of credibility compared to other channels and their creators, the 
growth in irregularly employed individuals opening up about their situations is an action 
that can be viewed as desire by the irregularly employed population to be understood as 
well as to hopefully and ultimately spark the sense of urgency in key stakeholders like 
the government and companies, to push for changes that can improve conditions for 
irregular employees, that can be beneficial to all.  
 




 Professor David H. Slater of Sophia University has created a set of ethnographic 
papers with colleagues also related to Sophia University. As in the case of the YouTube 
videos of Tada no Furita, these ethnographies have been able to capture real people and 
their real experiences during COVID-19 in Japan.  
 
Freelance Workers  
The first paper in the collection overseen by David Slater that helps illustrate my 
arguments of the disparities existing for irregular workers, is titled “Japanese Freelance 
Workers Struggle during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Social Media, Critique, and 
Political Resistance” by Uno and O’Day. As of September 15, 2020, when the series of 
articles was published, Uno and O’Day noted that freelancers in Japan have been 
struggling due to the COVID-19 pandemic.  
Uno and O’Day cited a survey conducted by a crowdsourcing service company 
for freelancers and suggested that “more than 30 percent of freelance workers have 
reduced their income about 50,000 JPY per month while more than 15 percent report 
that their monthly income has reduced by at least 100,000 JPY” (Uno, O’day 2020).  
They also noted that work for freelancers has not been necessarily completely 
disappearing but instead the kinds of jobs that are available have been changing: “often 
ones with more direct personal risk are increasing.”(Uno, O’Day 2020). This means that 
if freelancers want to continue to earn incomes, they have to adjust to these new jobs 
and often put themselves at risk. Furthermore, the results acknowledged that, prior to 
the pandemic, the ability to work remotely was one of the biggest advantages for 
freelancers. While this may make it seem like freelancers would not bear the burden of 




Uno and O’Day state, “fulltime employees (seishain) for big companies transition to 
telework from home.”(Uno, O’Day 2020). These fulltime employees as well as some 
mid-sized and small companies are using their own employees for telework, which has 
reduced opportunities available for freelancers because they are not affiliated with these 
companies. Uno and O’Day make the important point that “the pandemic has rapidly 
revealed freelancers’ fundamental employment insecurity and lack of safety net.” (Uno, 
O’Day 2020). 
Uno and O’Day note that there has been a significant increase in freelance work 
in Japan and cited another crowdsourcing service that has forecasted that over half of 
the Japanese population will be engaged in freelancing by 2027 and that lifetime 
employment will shift to no longer be the norm. Moreover, especially since 2016, there 
has been an effort by the Japanese government to reform labor, resulting in the creation 
of “The Action Plan for the Realization of Work Style Reform,” largely promoting 
flexibility in work settings and regulations. While the government has used this in an 
effort to encourage all citizens to work, irregular work like freelancing still is not seen 
in an equal lens to regular employment. This is apparent in MHLW’s COVID-19 relief 
“efforts” (double quote marks because many people view these efforts as insufficient).  
Uno and O’Day state,  “The Ministry compensated companies up to 8,330 JPY per 
person per day from employment insurance. However, freelancers, ineligible to receive 
subsidies through companies, could apply to the government to receive only up to 4,100 
JPY per person per day, and up to 200,000 yen in emergency loans.” (Uno, O’Day 
2020). As part of their ethnographic data, Uno and O’Day selected several direct quotes 




in response to the disparities in government assistance. Many who defended the 
disparities believed that freelancers have “self-responsibility” (jiko sekinin) and needed 
to understand that they chose this style of employment and needed to deal with 
whatever consequences would occur. (Uno, O’day 2020). Meanwhile, many freelancers 
felt that this treatment was not reflective of true efforts to encourage all Japanese 
citizens to participate in the workforce and that their work did not have the same value 
simply because they were not attached to a company like regular employees (Uno, 
O’Day 2020). Some media coverage of the issue also represented freelancers as 
underserving of equal assistance, prompting response from freelancers like one of the 
tweets used in the article stating, “Today's Abema TV[online television network] 
program described 'freelancers as the people who pursue dreams,' and debated whether 
their struggles are justified by 'self-responsibility.' Freelancers are now just a group of 
ordinary workers and not some group of dreamers. I'm shocked to see that the media 
coverage is too divorced from reality.” (Twitter: @konno_haruki, April 21, 2020 as 
cited in Uno, O’Day 2020). Other respondents noted that in a normal situation they 
would not expect any assistance, but a global pandemic, like a natural disaster, is 
something unavoidable regardless of one’s employment status (Uno,  O’Day 2020).  
Uno and O’Day compared the backlash from freelancers over COVID-19 relief, to 
backlash from freeters in the early 1990s and 2000s as the former seems to echo the 
same themes of work exploitation and bearing the burden through themes of “self-






Restaurant Workers  
Restaurant workers were another vulnerable population identified in Slater and 
his team’s series of articles. In the article titled “How are Tokyo’s Independent 
Restauranters Surviving the Pandemic” by James Farrer, Professor of Sociology and 
Global Studies at Sophia University. Because they had to resort to operating through 
takeout only, business has been difficult for many Japanese restaurants. Farrer noted 
that restaurants faced different situations. On one hand, a lot of local “mom and pop” 
restaurants have been surviving thanks to personal connections among communities, 
friends, and family. On the other hand, many larger chain restaurants have had to close 
down locations, and other local independent restaurants were not so lucky to have heavy 
support (Farrer 2020). 
 Farrer noted that, at the time of collecting data and writing the article, it was not 
clear what the long-term impact the pandemic would have on the fulltime employees 
and owners of restaurants, but “some of the first people to be affected were the part-
time and temporary employees at restaurants, particularly service staff.” (Farrer 2020). 
One individual who was interviewed was a student from South Asia who had been 
working at an Indian restaurant in Tokyo. The student said that her hours were cut 
because she was no longer needed with the restaurant’s takeout operations, even though 
business had been strong. The student expressed that she was seeking out work at a 
grocery store, putting herself at more risk for contact during COVID-19, in order to 
make money (Farrer 2020). This student’s experience is reflective of that of many other 
young people in Japan working temporary and part-time jobs in the service industry. 




Cleaning and Sanitization Workers   
Written by Makiko Deguchi and Matsumoto Chie, the article “Voices of 
Sanitation Workers in Japan amidst the COVID-19 Pandemic,” highlights the physical 
vulnerability of sanitation workers, another irregularly employed and vulnerable 
population. The authors interviewed six older men, all in their forties to seventies, 
working in sanitation and garbage collection to get their views of the situation. Deguchi 
and Matsumoto identified seven major themes based on these interviews: (1) alerting 
overseas news of potential dangers; (2) fear of contracting Covid-19; (3) negotiated for 
safer protocols and gear; (4) increased workload; (5) experience of discrimination and 
stigma; (6) increased public attention and awareness; and (7) “our Work Goes Beyond 
Garbage Collection.” (Deguchi and Matsumoto 2020). Overall, the authors identify 
these workers as extremely essential but also extremely underappreciated individuals. 
While it is important to note that the scope of my paper is in regard to irregularly 
employed youth and vulnerabilities they face in relation to the pandemic, I find value in 
mentioning these other older groups of irregularly employed individuals as they, too, 
face hardship due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The workers interviewed stated that, not 
only has their work become more dangerous due to COVID-19, but their work has also 
become busier because more people at home means more waste and garbage produced 
at home that the sanitation and garbage workers must take care of (Deguchi, Matsumoto 
2020).   
 Deguchi and Matsumoto also found discrimination and stigma toward sanitation 
workers. They write, “Stories in the media include, for instance, sanitation workers 




(Fujii, 2019, quoted Deguchi, Matsumoto 2020). Another important aspect of the article 
deals with how garbage collection has become privatized, and, instead of having 
fulltime workers, they hire many temporary workers or those who otherwise work on a 
short-term basis. One union official who was interviewed stated, “I don’t think they 
have the same level of commitment and devotion that we do, and they can’t. This 
affects whether or not they can act quickly in emergency situations.” (Deguchi,  
Matsumoto 2020). With these statements, the union workers and other fulltime 
sanitation workers seem to view short-term and otherwise more irregularly employed 
individuals as harmful to the long-term operations of sanitation, which can also 
highlight sentiments of less loyalty to companies from irregularly employed workers in 
comparison to regular workers.   
 
COVID-19 as a Nighttime Virus  
Valentina Giammara, a Ph.D. candidate at Sophia University, took to writing 
about “COVID-19 in Japan: A Nighttime Disease,” focusing on how COVID-19 had an 
effect on Kabuki-chō, the red-light district located in Shinjuku, Tokyo, and the workers 
associated with those in the settai (business entertainment) industry. Giammara first 
noted the initial response by the Japanese government in regard to mandates on the 
population and identified how Japan’s government “requested,” instead of insisted, that 
Japan minimize close contact and stay home (Giammara 2020). Some businesses closed 
temporarily in accordance with the request, but business owners ultimately were able to 
make the decision on their own of whether to stay open or not regardless of COVID-19 
risks. Giammara observed that, at any time of day and with any demographic of the 




meanings of jishuku (self-restraint) that was suggested by the government and could be 
seen travelling, going out to eat, going out in public without masks among other 
behaviors. However, those affiliated with “nightlife,” like host and hostess bars, were 
the ones vilified by the public and by the media. Giammara also noted that the 
vilification by some went as far as to “the extent of suggesting that [settai workers] did 
not deserve the 100,000-yen compensation bond that every other resident received” 
(Giammara 2020).  
Giammara interviewed several kyabajo (woman working in a hostess bar) and 
male hosts, all in their twenties and early thirties, to get an idea of how the pandemic 
has affected their work. Host and hostesses at their respective bars, work to serve drinks 
to and provide entertainment through conversation to mostly those of the opposite sex.   
One of the male hosts, K., stated that he had not been working and had not earned any 
income since the end of March. His club also did not give any allowance to the 
employees as his salary is based on hours spent at the club with clients (Giammara 
2020).  
A thirty-two-year-old kyabajyo, A. stated that she has not received any money 
from the club since it closed at the beginning of April. However, “she keeps in touch 
with her clients daily, something that all kyabajyo do as part of the unpaid effective 
labor that comes along with job.”(Giammara 2020). A. noted that she “refuses to meet 
her clients personally because she “heard from the news that three-quarters of the 
infected people in Japan contracted the virus in nightclubs” (Giammara 2020). Although 
A. refused to meet her clients in person, many hosts and hostesses do so to make money 




vilification of nightlife and the workers associated with it. She noted that K. and A. had 
not heard of any friends contracting COVID-19 in nightclubs, and both had only heard 
of these contractions on the news and social media (Giammara 2020). 
 In looking at these ethnographic papers, Kōsuke’s experiences, and some of the 
data that has become available concerning irregular workers, it is evident that there are 
disparities that irregular workers must face in times of crisis. Moreover, in each of the 
ethnographies I read, researchers discuss individuals feeling as though they had no 
value and were almost dehumanized by many non-irregular workers who refused to 
sympathize with them. Especially in the article about the freelancers, the fact that the 
point needed to be made by one of the freelancers that they would not expect assistance 
during a time that was not an emergency situation like COVID-19 also shows that there 
may be pressure from irregular workers to constantly prove themselves. It is also 
important to note, that even within irregular work, there is a wide variety of different 
types of jobs, and each has been impacted in a different way from COVID-19, and these 
ethnographic papers work to highlight just a few different jobs and experiences of 





Chapter  3: How Societal Views and Issues Have Relevance to Youth 
Irregular Employment and Contribute to the Disparities that Exist 
Between Types of Employment  
In previous sections, I explained what irregular employment is, how it pertains 
to the younger generation, and, on the basic level, how irregularly employed individuals 
have been impacted by COVID-19. This chapter will transition into the second part of 
the argument of this thesis. In the previous section, I discussed how irregular employees 
have been bearing more of a burden during COVID-19, and I briefly touched on how 
irregular employment has been seen as inferior to regular employment. To try to gain 
some understanding of why some of the distaste for irregular employment may exist, 
and why there seems to be less urgency to assist irregular employees, in this section, I 
will examine some basic understandings of Japanese cultural values and representations 
in society through media and popular culture about irregular workers.  
HOFSTEDE’s Intercultural Dimensions  
A notable place to start when looking at a specific nation’s values and social 
norms is through the Intercultural Dimensions developed by Geert Hofstede. While 
Hofstede’s intercultural dimension cannot precisely narrow down the thought process of 
every individual in Japan, it can give a sense of general background and, in relation to 
other countries, what values are important to many Japanese people and what 
characteristics make up the general norms of Japanese culture. There are six dimensions 
that make up Hofstede’s intercultural analysis: power distance, individualism, 




purpose of this project, I will compare the scores of the dimensions (Figure 1)  for both 
Japan and the United States to better illustrate the spectrum of how values are weighted 




Figure 1: Hofstede’s Intercultural Dimensions, Comparison of Japan, and 
the United States. Scores for Japan  are in blue, and scores for the United 
States in are in purple (“Country Comparison”). 
 The first dimension, power distance represents how levels of power are seen 
within the country. The United States has a score of forty (out of one hundred), while 
Japan has a score of fifty-four. The debrief on the Hofstede website generalizes, 
“Japanese are always conscious of their hierarchical position in any social setting and 
act accordingly” (“Country Comparison”), indicating that clear differences in power are 
marked in Japanese society.  
 The category of individualism reflects a nation’s tendency to put more emphasis 
on the individual rather than more emphasis on the whole. Japan tends to be more 
group-oriented with a Hofstede score of forty-six, while the United States tends to be 
extremely individualistic with a score of ninety-one (“Country Comparison”).  Japanese 




being shameful by doing one’s best not to be an inconvenience to other people. These 
scores indicate that many people in Japan value harmony and believe in following 
tradition. Often times, many people might feel that getting along with colleagues and 
other individuals in other group settings can be more important than one’s actual 
technical skills. This relates to the theme of ibasho that will be discussed later on and 
shows the importance of belonging in social groups, which can also be in the 
workplace.  
 The next dimension, masculinity, reflects a nation's competitiveness and value 
of what is considered “quantity of life,” as opposed to “quality of life.” Japan has an 
extremely high score of ninety-five, while the United States has a moderately high score 
of sixty-two. This score shows that Japan is seems to be extremely competitive country, 
and youth are exposed to competition from an early age, for example, with public class 
rankings from exams in school and difficult placement tests when entering high school 
and universities. Moreover, the job-hunting experience in Japan can be extremely 
difficult and stressful for many, as often there are some strict qualifications that must be 
met to be offered a position. Additionally, the survey data indicates that Japan still 
promotes the patriarchal idea that the man of the household is the one to earn an 
income, while the woman in the household is supposed to stay home to take care of the 
home and the family.  
 Uncertainty avoidance is the next dimension, and it reflects a nation's 
willingness to take risks with unknown outcomes. Japan scores very high for 
uncertainty avoidance at ninety-two. The score for uncertainty avoidance can be 




avoidance, combined with long-term orientation (the next dimension), can partially 
explain the reasons why the majority of Japanese individuals pursue, or encourage 
pursuing, becoming seishain instead of engaging in irregular work, as becoming a 
seishain creates a decrease in uncertainty towards one's future.  
 The next dimension is long-term orientation, which represents whether a country 
is more concerned about short-term outcomes or long-term outcomes. For Japan, 
planning for the long-term is displayed in the scores as a very important cultural value, 
with a score of eighty-eight. As discussed above, one’s career is often a decision for the 
extreme long-term in Japan, as it is not as common to change jobs and careers 
throughout life in Japan as it is in other countries. 
Finally, the last Hofstede dimension is indulgence. Japan scores somewhat lower 
than the United States with scores of forty-two and sixty-eight, respectively. This 
dimension can loosely relate to the concepts of employment in the sense that, according 
to the Hofstede Insights, “Restrained societies do not put much emphasis on leisure time 
and control the gratification of their desires.”(“Country Comparison”). It has been noted 
that Japanese workers, especially in seishain positions, are extremely dedicated to their 
jobs and work extremely long hours. Also reported are instances of work-related stress, 
even of suicide, as a result of individuals taking up these positions (“Country 
Comparison”).  
These scores are not completely indicative of Japan’s culture, as, just like with 
any other culture, all Japanese people do not have the exact same values and cannot be 
put under the same umbrella for all values. However, one is able to get a reasonable 




avoidance,” and “long-term orientation” are integral to a general idea of Japanese 
culture and society in comparison to at least the United States in this case. With these in 
mind, one can also make a basic argument that irregular employment which, in most 
cases, is not for the long-term, can be looked down upon, as it is not in alignment with 
the strong drive for thinking of the long-term that is seen in the Hofstede scores. 
Moreover, and going along with long-term orientation, the prominence of uncertainty 
avoidance can also highlight a reflection of the disapproval by many of irregular 
employment, due to many unknown outcomes being associated with those types of 
positions.  
Other Japanese Cultural Themes  
Ibasho or “Place Where I Belong”  
Ibasho, meaning the “place where one belongs,” is deeply connected to 
employment and workplaces. Since ibasho can be any place where a person feels 
comfortable and at home, Duke University Professor of Anthropology, Anne Allison, in 
her 2012 article in the Cambridge Journal of Anthropology, argues that ibasho often is 
the workplace for seishain, people engaged in regular employment. The concept of 
ibasho is a concern for young people because, if they are not respected and appreciated 
in a workplace setting, they may feel that they do not have an ibasho. Also, the 
workplace provides a regular income and economic structures of care. 
 Allison extends the topic of ibasho into a greater argument of what she calls 
“My-homeism.” She writes that, following World War II, Japan became an “enterprise 




consumerism (Allison 2012).  Many people viewed owning a home, that was new, in a 
neighborhood, with wonderful appliances as the goal, which can also be the case in the 
United States and other countries. Allison discussed how “My-homeism” was crippling 
for those engaged in irregular work as this societal dream was not something they could 
easily achieve. As a result, many irregular workers felt ashamed. Allison theorizes that, 
during the summer 2007, individuals committed acts of violence out of frustration and 
anxiety of not being able to achieve this goal(Allison 2012). Allison states that the 
incidents of violence led to much discussion and prejudice against young temporary 
workers in general (Allison 2012).  
 Allison’s perspectives on ibasho and “My-homeism” add to the discussion of 
general societal pressure on irregular employees to find where they belong. If 
someone’s ibasho is assumed to be their workplace, university graduates and otherwise 
technically “capable” young individuals should be able to find the place where they 
belong within the confines of a regular job as a seishain. Although the true definition of 
ibasho means “a place where one belongs,” it seems that ibasho is more reflective of a 
space within society and functioning with other people, rather than simply a physical 
space. I would like to question why ibasho in employment cannot mean finding one’s 
place on one’s own.  
Popular Culture Representations of Irregular Employment among Youth  
Analyzing popular culture, particularly films, television dramas, literature, and 
the mass media, that are heavily consumed in Japan, can provide some insight into 
commonly held ideas and values in Japan. I have identified a few popular sources that I 




and novel that I analyze are works of fiction. Although they are fiction, I believe the 
content reflects the values of the people who created them and offer ideas for their 
viewers and readers to consider. 
Examples in Television Drams and Films 
Perusing lists of films and television dramas and watching some that had 
relevance to irregular work, I came up with a few different examples to highlight. The 
first is a fall 2010 Japanese television drama titled Freeter, Buy a House ( Freeter, Ie o 
kau), starring popular singer and actor Ninomiya Kazunari, as the freeter in question. 
The series was widely popular and won the Series Drama Grand Prix at the Tokyo 
Drama Awards of 2011. Ninomiya won an award for best actor. Freeter, Buy a House is 
based on a novel of the same title by Arikawa Hiro. It is the fictional story of Take Seiji, 
a recent university graduate who had finally gotten a fulltime job but then quit said job 
and became a freeter. The show helps dispel freeter stereotypes. Seiji is as a very 
apathetic character who is unable to fit-in to the working style and demands of a regular 
fulltime job. While the show is fictional, viewers can gain a sense of how freeters, other 
irregular employees, and unemployed individuals are viewed in Japan through Seiji's 
conversations and relationships with his family, friends, and other coworkers. Because 
Seiji is not motivated to work in a regular fulltime position, his relationship with his 
father becomes extremely hostile to the point where the only conversations between the 
two are arguments. As some other issues in the family arise, Seiji ends up deciding that 
he will save money and find a suitable new home for the family. Thus Seiji becomes a 




to find a home and be happy without conforming to expectations for fulltime 
employment in Japan.  
To sum up some takeaways from “Freeter, Buy a House,” I interpreted the show 
as presenting three main assumptions about irregular employment: (1) irregular 
employees lack motivation and are unable to fit in; (2), irregularly employed individuals 
can and should change; and (3)  irregular employed individuals cannot succeed. While 
the end of this drama shows irregular employment in a positive light, by illustrating 
how an irregular employee could be able to provide for his family, it still, at the core, 
seems to promote the stereotype that irregular employees are lazy and that they need to 
change or develop some motivation and succeed in some way to show that they are as 
worthy as regularly employed individuals. In noting this, I hope to illustrate again, that 
some irregular workers choose to work in irregular employment due to the convenience 
of flexible working hours and having families among other needs. Thus I challenge if it 
is fair to place this expectation for change and “doing better” onto irregular employees, 
when even in regular employment, there will always be workers who do not seem to 
work as hard as others.  
Tamako in Moratorium  
In the 2013 film Tamako in Moratorium (Moratoriamu Tamako), Tamako is a 
recent university graduate who returns home to live with her father and proceeds to 
enter a year-long moratorium. Her disheveled appearance and laziness, once again, is a 
portrayal of the stereotypical characteristics typically associated with unemployed and 
irregularly employed individuals in Japan. She faces some pressure from her father to 




expected of her is nowhere near as high as was present in Freeter, Buy a House for the 
male character Seiji. Both are fictional stories, so it is difficult to compare due to 
differences in what the writers may have wanted to convey, but one can assume that, if 
instead of Tamako, it was a son portrayed in the film, that the expectation to find a job 
would be much higher. This is due to the continuity of the patriarchal belief that women 
should prioritize marrying and becoming housewives.  
 Additionally, the film shows a different type of irregular employment. At one 
point, it appears that Tamako is attempting to audition to be a part of an music idol 
group. With the number of idol groups in Japan, it is difficult to reach a level of stardom 
that is suitable to sustain one's life. Additionally, the fact that she is a university 
graduate and should be qualified for a range of other jobs is another representation of 
how this is irregular. One can also see the importance of age and appearance, as she 
believed to be too old to actually become an idol.  
 The film continues to illustrate her “moratorium” in terms of her behaviors in 
life, which are not limited to her job-hunting related action but also include her 
socialization. When seen by her former classmates and friends in her hometown, she 
tries to ignore them and does not want to attend any gatherings with them. Although not 
blatantly stated in the film, the viewer can assume that it is because Tamako feels shame 
in having to talk about what she has been doing since she graduated from university and 
returned back home.  
 Tamako in Moratorium also depicts stereotypes of irregular employees, and, in 
this case searching but unemployed individuals, as lazy, apathetic, and lost in life. 




getting a job, among other “ideal” results, and instead, ends just as abruptly as it started. 
This can be interpreted as showing how “static,” or unchanging, Tamako, and by 
extension other irregularly employed and unemployed youth, may be.  
Somebody 
The 2014 Somebody (Nanimono) follows the story of a group of university 
graduates entering the job hunting (shūkatsu) process. The film shows how the process 
of finding a job is troubling in the sense that young graduates have to compete with 
their friends and acquaintances in order to secure spots in the workforce. This process 
can set up individuals for how the rest of their life will play out. The film takes many 
critical approaches towards the matter, first by showing how limited job applicants are 
at illustrating their qualifications and worthiness of positions. One translated quote from 
the film about the interview process stated, “What we can say in one minute is as 
limited as the 140-character limit on Twitter. Expressing yourself as concisely as 
possible is everything during job hunts.”(“Somebody” 2014). This quote also reflects 
the weight that resumes have over interpersonal interactions during the process, which 
can lead to senses of dehumanization among applicants and make them feel merely like 
names and faces on paper.  
The film also depicts conflict between two characters with different views on 
regular and irregular employment. One character argues that Japan is entering an age of 
individualism. The character remarks, “It seems like everyone who is job hunting has 
lost their compass. Swept away by the tide, they’ve lost sight of their goals. What are 




making this remark and says that thinks he is too good for everyone else and the 
companies that he refuses to apply for (“Somebody” 2014). 
Overall, the film displays the anxieties youth commonly face, regardless of 
whether they choose to pursue regular or irregular work. Especially in the 
abovementioned scene, the film seems to promote conflicting views on individualism 
versus fitting into the model of regular employment. It also seems to reflect a desire 
among young people to follow their own passions instead of working for companies 
where they could potentially lose sight what it means to be themselves. Although it was 
not directly stated in the film, it can be interpreted that this film is also making an 
argument for a need for structural changes within the job-hunting process and for 
companies to ensure that their employees have a sense of fulfillment through their work. 
(I will discuss the latter issue in more detail in the next chapter.)  
 
Popular Literature: Example of Convenience Store Woman  
Murata Sayaka’s 2016 novel, Convenience Store Woman, (Konbini ningen) won 
the Akutagawa Prize, one of Japan’s most prestigious literary awards, and has has been 
translated into global languages, including English. Convenience Store Woman is just 
one of Murata’s works that showcases experiences of women in modern Japan 
including her most recent 2020 novel titled Earthlings. Convenience Store Woman is 
notable as a novel about a freeter, as Murata herself worked at a convenience store as a 
freeter.  
 Convenience Store Woman is the fictional story of a woman named Keiko, who 
feels that she has never fit into the norms of those around her. It was not until Keiko 




in. Convenience Store Woman brings out the “regular” in what is considered “irregular” 
work, by reference to how Keiko is also a metaphorical cog in the machine that is 
Japan’s workforce and, even more specifically, the convenience store Keiko works at. 
This theme is present as early as the fourth page as Murata writes: “The morning period 
is passing normally in the brightly lit box of the convenience store, I feel. Visible by the 
outside windows, polished free of fingerprints, are the figures of people rushing by. It is 
the start of another day, the time when the world wakes up and the cogs of society begin 
to move. I am one of those cogs, going round and round. I have become a functioning 
part of the world, rotating in the time of day called morning”  (Murata 2016). 
 Moreover, Murata writing about a woman who is a freeter is worth noting, as 
although women make up a large number of freeter in Japan and in many cases, are 
mothers who want to work part time jobs. Additionally, women older than college age 
are often not included in freeter data even though they are also freeter. The lack of 
representation of women older than college age in data for freeter, seems to be 
indicative of the common assumption and expectation that women will become 
housewives.  
Media Representations of Irregular Employment  
 A non-fiction article from 2020 written by Kawai Kaoru, a health sociologist 
published in the Nikkei Business Magazine tells the story of two sisters from similar 
educational backgrounds but lead different lives because one sister is a seishain and the 
other is an irregular, contract worker. This article shows the struggles of being an 
irregular worker, in Japan and starts with both sisters graduating from a private 




an irregular worker. The article mentions how the two sisters are very unequal in terms 
of wages and also discusses how irregular workers are often told they will have 
opportunities for promotion but are never actually rewarded with those opportunities. 
This article highlights the disparities between regular and irregular workers as well as 
introduces a new development: that a lawsuit about the inequities has been taken to the 
Japanese Supreme Court in an attempt to ensure that irregular workers are fairly 
compensated for their labor (Kawai 2020).  
 Looking further into this matter, it appears that there have been two cases filed 
in the Japanese supreme court, about adequate compensation, with the cases reaching 
their conclusions in February of 2019 and October of 2020. The lawsuits were both 
filed by women and were  filed against Tokyo Metro Co. and Osaka Medical College 
respectively. (Kyodo 2020). Although it was noted that there were equality laws put in 
place for irregular employees in 2013. The results of the cases did not result in a manner 
which followed the laws against inequalities, and was disappointing for many irregular 
workers in Japan, (Kyodo 2020).  
By looking at some fictional and non-fictional representations of irregular 
employment, one can observe that there are some specific cultural norms and 
expectations that put irregular workers in a place considered inferior to regular workers, 
and, therefore, as less ideal. By looking at Hofstede’s scores, it can be generalized that 
many people in Japan value the long term over the short term and avoid uncertainty, or 
as I often refer to (in the words of Anne Allsion, as “precarity”. Meanwhile, being an 
irregular worker, or having difficulty with finding an ideal long-term, fulltime job is 




above. These themes are also reflected in the other sources I have analyzed, including 
ethnographic studies and social media posts and videos decrying that irregular workers 
have less access to financial aid under Japanese government COVID-19 response 
efforts. These government responses to irregular employment , as well as those of 
companies, will be highlighted in the next section, and will consider both pre-COVID-





Chapter 4: Business and Government Level Policies that Interfere with 
Opportunities for Change for Irregular Employment and Structure of 
the Workforce  
Major structural changes to labor policies made by Japan’s Prime Ministers and 
their Cabinets have played a role in how irregular employment as it currently stands has 
taken shape. Koizumi Junichiro served as Japan’s Prime Minister from 2001 to 2006. 
Many policy reforms in Japan that led to changes in the workforce for irregular work 
can be tied to structural reform policies during the Koizumi era. One aspect that 
Koizumi covered was strengthening the safety net for unemployment to give better aid 
to unemployed individuals and provide support for small and medium sized companies. 
Moreover, Koizumi introduced the “Front Loaded Reform Program” in October 2001, 
which was a plan to generate one million jobs in a three-year span. These new jobs 
would be created in new public services, in newly growing areas, and for assisting with 
reemployment. Additionally, Koizumi implemented internships for the younger 
generation (Mulgan 2013) .   
Prime Minister Abe Shinzō served as Prime Minister from 2006-2007 and 2012-
2020 and became Japan’s longest serving Prime Minister. Abe implemented many 
policy reforms in an attempt to stabilize the economy, under a program often referred to 
as “Abenomics.” A few of the major policies included in “Abenomics” are stimulus 
packages intended to improve infrastructure and a structural reform program that was 
proposed to deregulate employment and push for more diversity in the workplace. In the 




his “Abenomics 2.0,” Abe turned to focus on the pre-existing issues of the birth rate and 
social security (McBride and Xu 2018).  
The issue of a hyper aging society that Abe attempted to address has relevancy 
to irregular employment as well. Japan has seen an issue in the balance of the 
population in terms of age groups. Japan has the fourth highest average life expectancy 
at birth in the world (84.65 years, total for both men and women). However, 2021 
estimates for population growth rate and birthrates, -0.37 percent  and 7 birth/1000 
population respectively, rank Japan 224th in the world. The number of individuals over 
the age of sixty-five is extremely high in Japan with 29.18 percent  of the population 
falling into this age bracket (Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 2021). Meanwhile, 
Japan has seen a downward trend in population growth since 2009 (World Bank 2021), 
with fertility rates hovering mostly between 1.3 and 1.4 for over twenty years (lowest at 
1.26 in 2005 and highest at 1.45 in 2015) (World Bank 2021). Fewer young people are 
having children, and those who do are having fewer children than past generations. This 
decrease in birthrates can be connected to precarity and uncertainty faced by younger 
individuals, both in terms of feeling confident in engaging in romantic relationships, 
and once in relationships, whether or not the couple will be able to support raising a 
child or multiple children. Younger individuals being involved in irregular employment 
also has an impact on this. As Allison and Baldwin (2015) write, “Not only attaining 
work but attaining sustainable work has become difficult for young people as the 
putative norm of career-long tenure with a stable employer is becoming replaced by a 
labor force sharply divided between those with and those without regular employment.” 




them to be willing to risk starting a family. Moreover, when looking for a partner for 
marriage, and ultimately to have a family, employment status and the long-term outlook 
of  employment are heavily considered and having an uncertain outlook on employment 
can be detrimental on how someone looks as a prospective marriage partner (Allison, 
Baldwin 2015). 
Abe announced his retirement during 2020 and was replaced by the current 
Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide, which also creates new changes and uncertainty in 
Japanese society for what decisions Suga might make in the future although Suga had a 
decent approval at over 70 percent before taking office (Herskovits, Yokoyama 2020), 
although the same cannot quite be said now in May of 2021.  
   
COVID-19 Effects and Responses  
Table 1: “The COVID-19 pandemic in Japan and main measures taken 
by the government”  
Table compiled with information presented in the “Survey on the Impact that Spreading 
Novel Coronavirus Infection Has on Work and Daily Life” (JILPT 2020) 
 Event  
Mid- January (2020) “Confirmation of the first COVID-19 cases in 
Japan.” 
January 30 “Confirmation of the first COVID-19 cases in Japan”  
February 13 “Compilation of the government’s “emergency 
measures concerning the novel coronavirus 
infectious disease” (followed by a second round of 
emergency measures on March 10) and 
implementation of special measures for the 





February 25 “Formulation of the government’s “basic policy for 
countermeasures against the novel coronavirus 
pandemic” (later revised into Basic Policies for 
Novel Coronavirus Disease Control on April 7)” 
February 27  “Request for temporary closure of all elementary 
schools, junior high schools and senior high schools 
as well as special needs education beginning on 
March 2”  
 
Mid-March  “Number of cases in Japan reaches 1,000.” 
March 13  “Passage and enactment of a reform bill for the 
Amendment of the Act on Special Measures for 
Pandemic Influenza and New Infectious Diseases 
Preparedness and Response (enforcement from the 
following day)” 
End of March  “Number of cases in Japan surpasses 2,000.” 
April 6  “April 6: Number of cases in Japan jumps above 
4,000.” 
 
April 7 “Issuance of a “declaration of state of emergency” 
for 7 prefectures based on Article 32 (1) of the 
aforementioned act, and expansion of the declaration 
to all prefectures on April 17” 
 
April 7 “Approval of “Emergency Economic Measures to 
Cope with COVID-19” by a Cabinet decision (with 
subsequent amendment approved on April 20), which 
includes expanded financial measures and payment 
of “sustainability benefits” for SMEs as well as cash 
handouts of 100,000 yen to all citizens, etc.” 
 
May 14  “Lifting of the declaration of the state of emergency 
for 39 prefectures” 
 
May 21  “Lifting of the declaration of the state of emergency 
for 3 prefectures in the Kansai area” 
 






 According to the World Health Organization, Japan’s first official COVID-19 
case was confirmed on January 13, 2020, and cases remained minimal until April, when 
Japan first saw daily cases in the hundreds. The number of cases reported by the 
Japanese government dwindled for a while appearing to no longer be a concern until 
picking up again in August, and eventually staggering upward with the current peak 
number of daily cases being at 7,855 confirmed cases on January 9, 2021. As of May 6, 
2021, Japan has had 616,233 confirmed cases and 10,517 deaths (World Health 
Organization 2021). Also as reported on the WHO website, graphs of the cases 
showcase four major waves of COVID-19 cases to date, the first peaking in mid-April 
2020, the second peaking in the first week of August 2020, the third peaking in the 
second week of January 2021 and one currently at its peak at the time of writing this 
paper, from the end of April 2021.   
In terms of the response to the pandemic, Table 1 highlights some of the key 
actions made by the government during the first wave of COVID-19 in Japan. Abe, and 
from a global perspective, Japan, were both criticized for the handling of COVID-19, as 
Abe prolonged the decision-making process to postpone the 2020 Tokyo Olympics, 
(Osaki 2020). Abe was criticized by the Japanese people as prioritizing the Olympics 
over the wellbeing of the Japanese people. He came under more criticism and in 
Japanese society for his implementation of what the public referred to as “Abe no 
mask” (translating to “Abe’s masks”), when Abe decided to provide two reusable face 
masks to each Japanese household instead of providing other forms of financial relief or 




promote a healthy lifestyle during the pandemic that does not seem to be going 
anywhere after almost a year (Osaki 2020). 
 Moreover, with recent spikes in COVID-19 cases in Japan, and the ongoing 
presence of the pandemic globally, COVID-19 appears to maintain itself as a long-term 
hindrance to the world and its economies and people. Now in May 2021, Prime Minister 
Suga also faces the decision again of whether to hold, cancel, or postpone the Tokyo 
Olympics again.  
These historical points help to layout the ideas of that there are mixed feelings 
about Japanese leaders, which can be the case for leaders in many other countries as 
well. These leaders can be key stakeholders to making policy changes that could 
improve opportunities and treatment of irregular workers, but it seems as though while 
some of the issues that the recent Prime Ministers have tried to focus on have relation to 
irregular employment, specific action in the direction of changes for irregular 
employment has not been clearly seen thus far. It also helps to showcase the different 
changes and crises that Japan has encountered in the recent past, which seems to affect 
irregular workers faster and to a greater extent than regular workers. Transitioning now 
from the overview of the Prime Ministers who have had influence on the work force as 
well as a basic overview of the general timetable of COVID-19 in Japan and decisions 
made in relation, in the next section I will now highlight some points made by the 
Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare. I will explain some major concerns for labor 
and welfare, especially in the 2019 White Papers, which showcase some concerns and 
responses taken by management of large companies, who also act as stakeholders in 




White Papers About Managerial Concerns  
Currently only the White Papers for years 2003-2005 and 2012-2019 are posted 
for public view on the English version of the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor and 
Welfare’s Website. The 2020 White Paper was just made available on the Japanese 
website on February 24, 2021, but only the general complete report of all three  
components, health, labor, and welfare. I also looked at the Labor Economy specific 
White Paper for 2019.  
Takeaways for Japan and the Future as Outlined by the 2020 MHLW White 
Paper  
 Looking through the condensed Power Point version of the around 500-page 
White Paper by the Ministry of Labor, Health and Welfare, it was interesting to note 
how little focus was directly on COVID-19. The title of the presentation can be loosely 
translated to “Thinking about Social Security and Work Styles of the Reiwa Era” 
(Reiwa jidai no shakai hoshō to hatarakikata o kangaeru), which already seems to draw 
little attention to the pandemic. (The Reiwa period started on May 1, 2019.) In the 
presentation, while there was some mention of how the pandemic has greatly impacted 
many aspects including employment and economics, there was little mention of exactly 
how this was being seen. Although it is understandable that in the holistic report, there 
is less of a focus on the economic and labor related aspects, it was interesting to see 
how the  MHLW instead chose to focus on the long-term outlook of the Reiwa era, 
specifically pointing to the year 2040, twenty years into the future, instead of reflecting 




 It is important to note that one of the major points for discussion raised in the 
condensed version was the idea of a new sense of connection and community that has 
been noticeable in Japan following the pandemic. The presentation illustrated that the 
utilization of Zoom to maintain holding community meetings, including parenting 
seminars as exemplified in the papers, as well as actively supporting others through the 
use of free meal services to those in need. Additionally, isolation at home was said to 
have led to more domestic violence and abuse and help hotlines have commenced to 
assist those in said situations. This resource was identified as something that can be 
continued long after COVID-19 and is an example for other support services that the 
MHLW suggests that Japan work harder to implement. With more acceptance for aid to 
those in need and a better sense of community, this can also generate a sense of hope 
that irregular workers could also potentially be able to access some sort of aid in the 
future and be more accepted in Japanese society. This is certainly not so much the case 
now, as we saw in the ethnographic paper on freelancers that freelancers were being 
criticized for needing financial aid.   
Considering Actions of Companies Towards Irregular Employees and 
Employment Overall, as Outlined by the  2019 MHLW White Papers titled 
“Challenges Facing Japan” Work Styles and Labor Shortages” 
The report opened with positive remarks that the unemployment had hit a 
“twenty-six-year low of 2.4 percent in FY2018” (MHLW 2019) and that the number of 
regular workers had increased for the fourth year in a row. While in the bullet points, it 
was only noted that the number of regular workers was increasing, the graph below the 




MHLW also found it important to mention that the increases in nominal wages for 
fulltime workers and the hourly wages of part-time workers both had been increasing 
over the past few years.  
 One of the first major concerns that was identified in the White Papers was the 
status of labor shortage in Japan, particularly in small and medium-sized companies. 
According to the graphs, companies of all sizes had been suffering from labor shortages 
since 2013 (MHLW 2019). In response to these shortages, the MHLW claims that 
“companies are trying to hire more workers by, for instance, offering better employment 
conditions and boosting their recruitment strategies. But few companies are making 
efforts to improve their employment management and enhance the levels of workers’ 
fulfillment at work” (MHLW 2019). This statement is important, as feeling like one 
does not belong in the workplace and management issues in the workplace has been an 
important reason why irregular workers do not seek employment as seishain, and why 
many who are seishain experience high levels of stress among other issues at work.  
 “Non-regular” workers are directly mentioned on Page 8 in reference to how 
workplace environments should make employees feel more fulfilled. The MHLW noted 
that “among non-regular workers, involuntary ones and those feeling that they are 
unfairly evaluated in terms of job performance compared with regular employees tend 
to feel less fulfilled at work.”(MHLW 2019). They went on to suggest that non-regular 
workers be treated better by making improvements like offering more opportunities for 
promotion for non-regular workers and a fairer compensation system to promote more 
motivation from non-regular workers. As many contact workers, temporary workers, 




they are promised opportunities for advancement to permanent positions as long as they 
work hard but are never actually rewarded for their work. For many irregular 
employees, a change in how companies offer promotions for irregular workers would 
help end the precarity of being in a temporary position and would reward them for their 
work. It could encourage more potential employees to take up temporary positions, and 
this could help Japan’s labor shortage as well.  
The MHLW identified that 86 percent of companies in Japan took steps to try to 
minimize the labor shortage over the last few years, but smaller companies have been 
less active then larger ones at taking these steps (MHLW 2019). They also noted that 
companies were putting more effort into their hiring processes and were changing 
workplace regulations to let retired age employees continue working after the former 
mandatory retirement age of sixty. While 38.1 percent of companies mentioned 
appointing non-regular employees to regular employees, the MHLW still felt the need 
to suggest to all companies (MHLW 2019).  
 Most of the companies surveyed stated that one of the biggest difficulties they 
faced was hiring of new employees. Data noted 60 percent of the time nobody would 
apply to temporary job openings. Additionally, 23.6 percent of the time, applications 
were received, but the applicants were not at the level the company was looking for; 5.6 
percent of the time, there were qualified applicants, but the labor and working 
conditions that the applicants desired were not matched by the company. The remaining 
9.9 percent were able to hire applicants  but were unable to retain them (MHLW 2019).  
 In combination with discussion of fulfillment and confidence in one’s job, the 




employees age thirty-nine and under who stated that they had role model employees at 
their workplace (MHLW 2019). Additionally, regarding fulfillment of non-regular 
workers, survey data indicated that “35.1 percent of non-regular workers recognize that 
they do the same work as some of regular employees at the company they work for” 
(MHLW 2019). With this in mind, the MHLW suggested that non-regular workers 
would feel more fulfilled in their jobs if they were evaluated more fairly on their work 
and were recognized when completing work matching that done by the regular 
employees (MHLW 2019).   
From an international perspective the Organization for Economic Co-Operation 
and Development (OECD), published a series called “Investing in Youth” examining 
the situation of youth and labor in many countries including Japan in 2017, and, more 
recently South Korea, Finland, and Peru in 2019. The report looks at the situation of 
Japanese youth in 2017 and gives specific policy recommendations to ensure that youth 
are given the right opportunities to become employed. When assessing Japanese youth 
(ages fifteen to twenty-nine, as defined by the OECD) in labor, the OECD found that 
the youth employment rate had declined in the ten years leading up to 2017 by about 1.5 
million overall, but the decline was closely reflective of the overall decrease in the 
population of Japanese youth(OECD 2017). The OECD highlighted a bigger concern: 
“an increasing share of young workers in Japan work on non-regular contracts —43 
percent of all employed fifteen-twenty-nine-year-olds out of education in 2014” (OECD 
2017). The OECD seems to make the argument that lack of participation in regular 
employment is a result of the continuity of more irregular employment opportunities 




2017). While the MHLW White Paper from 2019 mentioned that businesses were 
hoping to increase the number of regular employees in their companies, the OECD in 
2017 assessed the finding that 43 percent of youth out of school were working under 
“non-regular contracts” as indicating a mismatch between youth and companies looking 
to hire (OECD 2017). I also would like to challenge that 43 percent of youth working in 
non-regular contracts seems like a good target market for companies to recruit from if 
they are looking to hire new regular employees.  
Moreover, mentioning differing attitudes towards support for irregular work, the 
MHLW has drafted a guide for supporting companies and business owners looking to 
shift irregular workers into long-term regular workers. This guide includes providing 
financial assistance for career enhancement for irregular employees and suggesting 
increases in minimum wage. Although as I noted when looking at the condensed 2020 
White Paper, irregular employment was not mentioned, the existence of this guide 
showcases a continued display by the MHLW that irregular workers are in need of 
resources and opportunities.   
Additionally, as Uno and O’Day found, freelancers have been experiencing 
unequal access to COVID-19 financial relief compared to regular workers; this was also 
pointed out by the JILPT surveys from April, May, and August regarding non-regular 
employees overall. At long last, some adjustments were made by the Japanese 
government in February 2021. As the JILPT survey reported, many regular and non-
regular workers did not receive compensation for being the times when they were 
unable to work due to the pandemic. A major issue arose regarding companies 




laws that “require an employer to pay employees 60 percent or more of their salaries 
regardless of their working status in the event of eave ordered by the company” (The 
Japan Times 2021). Reports found that companies were not applying for subsidies 
because the application process was complicated, and many companies “refused to 
compensate employees, claiming they were not responsible for leave necessitated by the 
pandemic” (The Japan Times 2021). Once the survey data was released, the government 
sought to fix this issue by allowing workers to apply for the aid individually instead of 
leaving applications in the hands of companies. However, under labor laws non-regular 
workers were not eligible to apply individually, leaving many without a chance to be 
compensated until February 2021, almost 8 months after regular workers became able 
to access compensation (The Japan Times 2021). Although policy changes to accessing 
compensation were finally made, this time difference seems to indicate continued lack 
of appreciation and recognition of irregular employees as contributing individuals who 
deserve fair treatment and compensation for their labor. As I pointed out earlier in this 
thesis, there still seems to be a strong sense of irregular work being inferior under 
policies and labor laws, as well as in public opinion. 
Relatedly, the White Papers for 2020, although not as devoted to the COVID-19, 
showed that the pandemic has significantly affected health, labor, and welfare, all 
components of the MHLW. The focus on 2040 and the shift from the last thirty years of 
Heisei era (1989-2019) to the new Reiwa era and what the outlook of the era would be, 
while inarguably important, does seem to support the notion of Japan being more long-
term oriented as opposed to short-term oriented, as I mentioned in my discussion of 




Understandably the White Papers are intended to be used to plan for the long-term, but 
it was slightly surprising to see how little of a focus the MHLW took on COVID-19 
although the duration of the virus as a global issue has now lasted over a year. However, 
the White Paper presentation pointed out that COVID-19 has created some general 
changes in society, such as encouraging individuals to be more supportive of one 
another and creating a safety net for food security and hotlines for aid; measures are 
being taken to ensure these changes will be implemented for the long run. Likewise, the 
immediate effects and outcomes in terms of employment and specific employees is an 
indicator for what issues and inequalities exist in Japan for different types of work. As 
the 2019 White Paper pointed out, even when companies offered regular positions, there 
was a huge lack of applicants. With the many examples unfair treatment that has been 
explored through this paper towards irregular workers, it seems understandable that 
some individuals may not take up these jobs, as many companies do not seem to be 
adequately creating a welcoming working environment for employees.  
Since the 1990’s when irregular employment began to rise due to recessions, 
changes in social structures and the nature of jobs, companies, and laws, in addition to 
changes in general public opinions toward life-work balance, more university graduates 
became unable to find jobs in regular employment or found interest in pursuing careers 
in non-regular fields, taking up more irregular positions. Concurrently, the numbers of 
youths who did not have access to education and job training rose. These populations 
were vulnerable to precarity in terms of labor. Additionally, based on the data from the 
2019 White Papers, many companies have been extending the retirement age to allow 




providing opportunities for older workers is also important, because many Japanese 
companies are not spending as much energy on restructuring work environments to suit 
younger individuals, this could lead to younger workers not applying for or going 
through with jobs that these companies offer. Alternatively, structural reform to wages 
and promotion opportunities for irregular employees could also benefit companies in 
the long run by fostering a similar sense of loyalty to the company that companies 






Concluding Thoughts  
In this thesis I argued that, through current events related to COVID-19, societal 
beliefs, and governmental and business level policies, that irregular workers in Japan 
have been subject to many disparities that harm their wellbeing during situations like 
COVID-19, as well as harm the ability to make major long-term changes to benefit 
Japan’s workforce and economic situation overall. I also acknowledged some other 
major issues outside of COVID-19 such as the hyper aging society and the balance 
between work and life. I illustrated the effects of COVID-19 on irregular workers 
through the data presented by the JILPT survey, as well as the work through interviews 
conducted by David Slater and his team at Sophia University. Moreover, societal beliefs 
and values and representations of irregular work in Japan (while aiming to avoid 
overgeneralizing and essentializing Japanese culture), was illustrated by highlighting 
Japan’s scores of Hofstede’s Intercultural Dimensions, other Japanese cultural themes 
and values, and media and popular culture portrayals of irregular work. This section 
also included more recent developments related to COVID-19 and financial aid for 
irregularly employed individuals. Finally, I discussed government level and business 
level policy and structural issues, by referencing how the Japanese government and 
businesses handled COVID-19 relief payments for irregular workers and administering 
more dismissals and pay cuts to irregular workers than regular workers. This section 
also included the White Papers from the MHLW, that acknowledged concerns for the 
future in terms of the workplace in 2019 and overall, in 2020.  
 In establishing this argument, I also proposed that more emphasis should be 




go through with promises made to irregular employees in regard to opportunities for 
advancement. While the article by Takahashi, the White Papers by the MHLW, and the 
overall view towards irregular employment that I highlighted in my section on societal 
values, suggest that businesses would prefer to increase regular employment rather than 
irregular employment, the fact that freelancing has become extremely popular since 
2018, as well as the other reasons that were found, like being able to work at times 
convenient for the employees and providing support to family, seems to suggest that, 
for the time being, irregular employment will still remain somewhat important to the 
Japanese workforce. However, by increasing employee fulfilment and working to target 
the young population of irregular employees, this may both benefit the long-term 
satisfaction of prospective employees who have been working towards becoming 
regular employees and improve conditions for companies who would like to hire regular 
employees.  
 At the most basic and short-term level, however, I propose that it is necessary to 
assist irregular employees in the same manner as regular employees during times of 
crisis. This is integral to not only to improve the wellbeing of irregular workers but also 
to promote a sense of mutual loyalty that could in turn also diminish the employment 
opportunities by companies that are left unfilled.  
 Finally, I would like to note that, COVID-19 still has a strong presence in Japan, 
as I mentioned, Japan entered its third COVID-19 related state of emergency in April 
2021. Thus it has become difficult to find new information of the state of employment 
in Japan with relevance to COVID-19. Accordingly, the JILPT survey data collection 




opportunities to report on the current events, but there have been fewer publications 
than during the first two major waves of COVID-19. Especially as Japan prepares to 
potentially yet again, postpone or even cancel the Tokyo Olympics, it seems that Japan 
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